Why the WB/IMF 10 Prescribed Reforms Haven’t Lifted Kenya, Bangladesh and South Africa Out of Economic Precarity
By Abbati Bako, Global Political Strategy and Communications Analyst
When the World Bank and IMF roll out their 10 prescription point tax‑and‑reform playbook, the promise is simple: tighter fiscal discipline, more efficient tax collection, and a market‑friendly environment that should spark faster, more inclusive growth. Yet the three countries Kenya, Bangladesh and South Africa – are still wrestling with sluggish growth, high debt service and persistent inequality. Here’s why the prescription isn’t working as expected. Hence, the government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu must be cautious in implementation of such 10 prescription points of the World Bank/IMF.
1. Debt overhang and limited fiscal space:
Kenya’s public debt is hovering around 5.3 % of GDP in interest payments alone, crowding out private‑sector borrowing and keeping interest rates high. The country’s fiscal deficit remains stubbornly high, leaving little room for productive public investment.
Bangladesh’s debt‑to‑GDP ratio edged up to about 40% in 2024, with interest payments already consuming 14% of the country’s budget. The need to service external loans eats into the resources that could be channeled into healthcare, transportation education or infrastructure.
2. Revenue mobilisation that never quite materialises:
Both Kenya and Bangladesh have introduced new taxes (VAT hikes, excise duties, a housing levy) under IMF guidance, but tax collection has lagged. Kenya’s Finance Bill sparked massive protests because the additional burden was seen as regressive.
In Bangladesh, despite higher statutory tax rates, the tax‑to‑GDP ratio stays below the South‑Asian average, reflecting weak administration and a large informal sector.
3. Political and social turbulence:
Kenya’s June 2024 protests forced the government to roll back tax hikes, showing how quickly reform momentum can be derailed by popular unrest. Most countries in the Global Southern Hemisphere succeed in implementation of the 10 prescriptions of WB/IMF especially among African Countries.
Bangladesh’s political uncertainty after the 2024 uprising has dampened private investment, keeping growth at a modest shape and despite that the former Prime Minister Madame Hasina migrated to India. Hence, Bangladesh is still economically precarious despite the taking over the government by the current leader Professor Yunus.
South Africa’s “Government of National Unity” has generated market optimism, but deep‑seated structural problems from energy shortages to a fractured education system continue to limit economic growth.
4. Structural imbalances that the reforms don’t fix:
Kenya’s economy is still “running on one engine”: domestic consumption is strong, but exports remain weak, leaving the country vulnerable to external shocks.
On the other hand, Bangladesh’s reliance on a narrow export base (garments, remittances) makes it susceptible to global demand swings, while its banking sector is plagued by high non‑performing loans.
South Africa’s growth is hampered by infrastructure bottlenecks, high youth unemployment rate (about 50%) and an education system that doesn’t produce the skills the current modern economy needs.
5. Social costs of austerity:
Cuts to subsidies and social programmes, a hallmark of many WB/IMF programmes, have raised the cost of essentials needs such as fuel, electricity, food security and deepened poverty, especially among the urban poor. The human cost of these measures often translates into political risk especially as the election year 2027 approaches which in most countries’ leaders particularly in Africa failed due to economic hardship experienced by their citizens. Human beings are the symbol of economy. Meaning that the economy is the life wire of human life.
Bottom line:
Implementing WB/IMF reforms does not automatically translate into economic stability when a country is shackled by high debt, weak tax administration, political volatility and structural dependence on a few sectors, especially dependency on oil. The “one‑size‑fits‑all or one medicine prescription for all illnesses” approach tends to overlook these local realities, leaving the economies in a precarious limbo even after the policy checklist is ticked. Hence, Professor John Williamson (global economic expert and his team located in New York) should rethink their guidance and advice to the World Bank on 10 prescriptions to economic emerging markets, especially in African countries.
Conclusively:
What do you think (the reader) are the most critical reforms that could help these countries break out of this cycle, especially Nigeria?
Do you see any emerging alternatives to the traditional WB/IMF model that might work better for the Global Southern Hemisphere?
Abbati Bako,psc,bsis,Political Strategy and Communications Consultant, an Alumnus of the University of Kent,the UK’s European University abbatibako@gmail.com
